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We investigate the difference in the characteristics of firms that cross-list on high versus low investor 
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larger and have a lower volume turnover than those that cross-list on civil law markets. Both groups 
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1. Introduction 
 
Abdallah and Goergen (2011) examine the evolution 
of control for foreign firms that cross-listed on 19 
stock markets. They find that these firms experience a 
decrease in their control concentration. This is the 
case for civil law firms that cross-list on common law 
markets and for both groups of common law firms. 
However, the finding is not upheld for civil law firms 
that cross-list on civil law markets. Abdallah and 
Goergen (2011) conclude that the control structure 
influences the choice of cross-listing location since 
cross-listing in different legal systems may have 
different implications for control.  
The foreign listing decision is also influenced by 
the financial needs of the firms. For instance, firms 
are more likely to cross-list if they are planning a 
strategic expansion that requires a large amount of 
external funds. Eiteman et al. (2010), argue that cross-
listing enables firms to move from an illiquid market 
to a liquid market, since the degree of liquidity is 
different from one market to another. In this regard, 
firms in illiquid and small markets may benefit from 
issuing shares internationally, hence enlarging their 
investor bases. The benefits and reasons for 
international listing of shares have been explored 
extensively in previous studies. Those benefits and 
reasons range from increasing share trading volume 
(e.g., Barclay et al., 1990; Chowdhry and Nanda, 
1991; Mittoo, 1992; Fatemi and Tourani-Rad, 1996; 
Noronha et al., 1996; Mitto, 1997; Domowitz et al., 
1998; Foerster and Karolyi, 1998), to increasing 
visibility (Baker et al., 2002), reducing cost of capital 
(Foerster and Karolyi, 1993; Foerster and Karolyi, 
1999; Miller, 1999; Ramchand and Sethapakdi, 2000), 
increasing the level of disclosure (Tesar and Werner; 
1995; Noronha et al., 1996; Frost and Pownall, 2000; 
Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Lang et al., 2003a; Lang 
et al., 2003b; Leuz, 2003; Abdallah et al., 2012), 
overvaluation (Abdallah and Ioannidis, 2010), and 
increasing investor protection through bonding 
(Fuerst, 1998; Coffee, 1999; Kelley and Woidtke, 
2001; Coffee, 2002; Reese and Weisbach, 2002; 
Barton and Waymire, 2003; Doidge, Karolyi and 
Stulz, 2003; Benos and Weisbach, 2004; Piotroski and 
Srinivasan, 2008).  
Although the literature has answered many 
questions related to cross-listing, little attempt has 
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been made to investigate the characteristics and 
choice of firms that cross-list on high versus low 
investor protection markets. We mainly investigate 
how a company’s characteristics determine its cross-
listing location. Therefore, in a univariate study, we 
examine the financial characteristics of cross-listed 
firms before the cross-listing and the implications of 
cross-listing for them. In particular, we investigate 
whether firms that cross-list on markets with good 
investor protection differ from firms that cross-list on 
markets with low investor protection. We compare the 
characteristics of our sample firms before and after 
the cross-listing. 
Subsequently, we run a logistic model to test the 
choice of foreign listing between regulated and 
unregulated international exchanges. More 
specifically, we focus on the factors that determine 
the choice of listing between regulated and 
unregulated exchanges with respect to investor 
protection. We find that firms from civil law regimes 
which cross-list on common law stock exchange 
markets have a higher growth rate, larger size and a 
lower turnover pre cross-listing than their 
counterparts that cross-list on civil law markets. 
Moreover, we document that firms from common law 
countries that cross-list on common law markets are 
larger and have a lower volume turnover than those 
that cross-list on civil law markets. Our results 
suggest that civil and common law firms that cross-
list on common law markets experience a significant 
increase in their growth during the cross-listing year. 
Furthermore, we also provide evidence which 
indicates that firms from poor investor protection 
countries, with a low-level of accounting standards, 
and that are small in size choose to cross-list on the 
US unregulated exchanges (mainly OTC and 
PORTAL) which have low investor protection 
regulations, listing and disclosure requirements. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. 
Section 2 presents the hypotheses to be tested. Section 
3 defines the sources of data and our variables and 
explains our methodology. Section 4 discusses the 
results, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Hypotheses to be tested 
 
We derive our hypotheses from the determinants of 
the cross-listing decision. Firms cross-list in order to 
raise capital, to improve the liquidity of their shares 
and to improve their product identification in the host 
country.  
 
2.1 Cross-listing and raising capital  
 
Firms cross-list in order to raise capital, especially 
when the financial constraints in their home country 
are binding. On the home market, the firm is restricted 
to a certain amount of capital determined by the 
demand and supply of the market. By listing abroad, 
the firms’ capacity to raise funds is expanded beyond 
what the firms might have been able to raise in their 
domestic markets. Mittoo (1992) reports that 
managers view access to foreign capital markets and 
the increased ability to raise equity as the main 
benefits of cross-listing.  
Recent research documents that stock markets in 
countries with good investor protection (La Porta et 
al., 1997) and higher compliance with legal norms, as 
measured by the law and order index (Demirgüc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 1998), enable firms to raise more 
external funds and grow more quickly. An effective 
legal system discourages the misbehaviour of 
corporate insiders and should, in principle, impose 
proper compensation for violations of investor rights. 
Furthermore, La Porta et al. (1997) find that the 
percentage of the market capitalisation of equity held 
by outsiders is higher in common law markets than in 
civil law markets, and the common law markets have 
a higher number of listed firms and IPOs than civil 
law markets. 
Firms that cross-list in order to raise capital may 
have a high level of leverage, high growth 
opportunities, or their capital needs may be larger 
than the capacity of their home markets. Due to the 
existing differences between common law markets 
and civil law markets regarding the ability of firms to 
obtain external funds, we hypothesize the following: 
H1. Given that common law markets enable 
firms to raise more external funds than civil law 
markets, firms that cross-list on common law markets 
have a higher level of leverage before the cross-listing 
than firms that cross-list on civil law markets.  
H2. Given that common law markets enable 
firms to raise more external finance than civil law 
markets, firms that cross-list on common law markets 
have higher growth opportunities before and after the 
cross-listing than firms that cross-list on civil law 
markets. 
H3. Given that common law markets are larger 
and more liquid than civil law markets, firms that 
cross-list on common law markets have a higher 
market capitalization relative to their home market 
before the cross-listing than firms that cross-list on 
civil law markets. 
 
2.2 Cross-listing and liquidity of the 
company’s shares 
 
Cross-listing the firm’s shares abroad makes it easier 
for foreign investors to acquire and trade the shares. 
Holding shares in the foreign firm in its domicile 
market is more risky than holding shares in a firm 
listed on the local market. This is because of the 
investment barriers resulting from differences in 
language, currency, financial reporting and auditing 
practices, and lack of coverage by financial analysts 
and the media in the foreign firm. Cross-listing 
reduces these barriers as the firm prepares periodical 
information complying with local requirements of the 
host country. The firm also benefits from local media 
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and financial analysts’ coverage. Accordingly, it will 
be easier for local investors to obtain timely and 
relevant information about the foreign firm. This will 
reduce the risk borne by foreign investors such as 
exchange risk fluctuations, hence encouraging 
investors to trade in the share. A survey conducted by 
Mittoo (1992) reveals that 28% of the managers cite 
increased liquidity of the firm’s share as a major 
benefit of cross-listing. Mittoo (1992) also reports that 
firms which voluntarily delisted from foreign 
exchanges cited lack of trading activity as the main 
reason for delisting. 
Firms that cross-list in order to improve the 
liquidity of their shares will seek to cross-list on 
markets with improved market information. The legal 
and regulatory environment determines the quantity 
and quality of publicly available information. A good 
shareholder protection environment minimises the 
asymmetry information in the market (Brockman and 
Chung, 2003), which in turn reduces the cost of 
trading for liquidity providers. This encourages them 
to trade more often since they are less likely to trade 
against informed traders. Therefore, we hypothesize 
the following: 
H4. Given that good shareholder protection in 
common law markets improves share liquidity, firms 
that cross-list on common law markets have a lower 
share turnover before the cross-listing than firms that 
cross-list on civil law markets.  
 
2.3. The choice of the cross-listing 
location  
 
Coffee (1999; 2002) argues that firms domiciled in 
low investor protection countries will bond 
themselves by listing on the US regulated exchanges 
(AMEX, NASDAQ, and NYSE). Doidge et al. 
(2004), and Abdallah and Goergen (2011) find 
supportive evidence. Nonetheless, it is worth noting 
that those exchanges are associated with a higher level 
of regulations and listing requirements, and hence, the 
compliance with their listing requirements requires 
significant costs to be incurred by the listing firms 
compared to those of the US unregulated exchanges 
(OTC and PORTAL). In this respect, Doidge et al. 
(2004) argue that the decision of firms from poor 
disclosure environments to list in the US is supportive 
of the bonding hypothesis. However, the decision of 
those firms to list on the US unregulated exchanges is 
to avoid extra costs associated with the listing 
requirements that are born by listing on the US 
regulated exchanges. Hence, it is expected that firms 
from environments with poor accounting standards, 
those domiciled in poor investor protection countries, 
those from civil-law countries, firms that have poor 
performance, and firms that are small in size are more 
likely to cross-list on the US unregulated exchanges, 
in order to signal to investors the importance of listing 
in the US while at the same time incurring fewer 
listing costs. Hence, we form the following 
hypothesis: 
H5. Firms that are small in size, have poor 
performance, or are from environments with low 
accounting standards, poor investor protection, or 
civil-law countries are likely to cross-list on the US 
unregulated exchanges to avoid the significant costs 
associated with listing on regulated exchanges. 
 
3. Sources of Data and methodology 
 
3.1 Sources of data 
 
To test hypotheses H1 to H4, we collected a sample of 
175 firms that cross-listed amongst 19 stock 
exchanges during the period of 1990 to 2000. This 
sample represents around 21% of the total population 
of cross-listed firms during that period, due to the fact 
that the sample was collected manually from websites 
and sometimes via email after calling the stock 
exchange when the list of firms was not available on 
the exchange website. 116 of these firms are from 
common law countries and 59 are from civil law 
countries.
2
 Table 1 provides the distribution of our 
sample firms by country of origin
3
 and the number of 
firms from each legal system and their cross-listing 
location (civil vs. common law system).  
To test hypothesis H5 we collected our second 
sample of firms that had cross-listed on the US and 
UK regulated, and US unregulated, stock exchanges. 
Our reasons for choosing these countries were two-
fold: first, the US is the only country that has 
regulated and unregulated exchanges, with differences 
in listing, disclosure, and regulation requirements. 
Second, the US and UK have been characterized as 
having the highest investor protection level 
worldwide (La Porta et al., 1997; 1998). 
Accounting data were obtained from Datastream 
and Thomson Analytics. Trading volume, number of 
shares outstanding, and market capitalization of the 
shares outstanding were all obtained from Datastream. 
When market capitalization is missing, we obtained it 
from the Federation of the Stock Exchanges (FIBV). 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
3.2.1 Univariate analysis 
 
For the univariate analysis, we divide our sample 
firms into four groups: (i) civil law firms that cross-
list on civil law markets, (ii) civil law firms that cross-
list on common law markets, (iii) common law firms 
that cross-list on civil law markets, and (iv) common 
law firms that cross-list on common law markets. This 
classification of firms allows us to test our hypotheses 
after controlling for the legal system of the country of 
origin, i.e., we can compare the characteristics of civil 
                                                          
2
 A similar sample was used by Abdallah and Goergen, 2008. 
3
 Country of origin is where the headquarters of the company 
is based. 
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firms that cross-list on common law markets with 
those of civil law firms that cross-list on civil law 
markets. To test the statistical significance of the 
differences between the groups, we perform t-tests 
and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests for the years –3 to 
+3 relative to the year of cross-listing.  
 
3.2.2 Definition of variables used in the univariate 
analysis 
 
Leverage is measured by dividing the long-term debt 
by the total share capital and reserves. Long-term debt 
represents the total capital repayable after one year; it 
includes debentures, bonds, convertibles and debt-like 
hybrid financial instruments. Total share capital and 
reserves is the equity share capital and reserves, 
including preference shares. Growth rate (Growth) is 
annual asset growth. Relative size (RSize) measures 
the relative market value of the firms on their 
domestic market. The relative size of the company is 
the ratio of the annual average market value of the 
company, divided by the market value of all the 
domestic firms listed on the home stock exchange at 
the end of the year, multiplied by 100. The annual 
average market value is the average value of the 
company market value for each day, defined by the 
closing price for that day multiplied by the shares 
outstanding. Share turnover (Turnover) is the ratio of 
the annual average volume of trading shares in 
thousands, divided by the number of shares 
outstanding at the end of the year. The trading volume 
is the volume on the home market, and we believe 
that this should be a good proxy for the total trading 
activity for each share (The trading volume on the 
foreign market is not available for most of the 
companies and including it in the analysis reduces our 
observations to almost half. In addition, other 
researchers such as Pagano et al. (2002) use the 
volume in the home market as a proxy for trading 
activity for cross-listed companies. However, they use 
the monthly figure of the volume at the end of 
December and we use the average daily figure per 
year). 
 
3.2.3 Logistic analysis 
 
We predict the choice of cross-listing between 
regulated and unregulated foreign exchanges. We 
estimate a logistic model, which allows us to examine 
if firms from poor investor protection countries are 
more likely to cross-list on regulated exchanges to 
signal a commitment to increase the level of investor 
protection. The model is given as: 
 
 
 
iPREi
PREii
DEVEMDROA
LNMVPROTECTIONINVESTORDFEXCH
4,3
,21 )(




 (1) 
 
where iDFEXCH  is a dummy variable that takes 
the value one if the firm cross-listed on regulated 
exchanges (AMEX, NASDAQ, NYSE and LSE) and 
zero if the firm has cross-listed on unregulated 
exchanges (OTC and PORTAL). We focus on the US 
and UK, since they are characterized as having the 
highest level of protection countries (La Porta et al. 
1997, 1998). For investor protection, we use three 
measures (accounting standards rating index, anti-
director rights index, and whether the firm is from a 
civil or common law country). PREiLNMV ,  is the 
natural log of the pre-cross-listing market value.
iLNVO  denotes the log of the trading volume during 
the post-cross-listing period (+2, +250). The average 
post-listing three years return on assets is given by 
PREiROA , . Finally iDEVMD  is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the firm is from a developed country 
and zero otherwise.
4
 As the measures of investor 
protection are highly collinear, it is difficult to include 
them in one equation as this may bias the estimated 
coefficients, and makes the results difficult to 
interpret. 
                                                          
4
 This dummy variable is used in Reese and Weisbch (2002). 
Under the hypotheses of investor protection one 
would expect that firms from countries where investor 
protection is weak will prefer to list on regulated 
exchanges to signal their resolve to provide security 
for the rights of minority shareholders. 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1 Characteristics of cross-listed firms 
 
In this section we discuss the characteristics of cross-
listed firms, and the differences between firms that 
cross-list on low investor protection markets, i.e., civil 
law markets and firms that cross-list on high investor 
protection markets such as common law markets. The 
characteristics we discuss here are leverage, total asset 
growth, relative size and share turnover. 
 
4.1.1 Leverage 
 
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for leverage, 
as measured by long-term debt, divided by total share 
capital and reserves. Most of the leverage figures are 
between 0 and +2 and a few observations are greater 
than +2. We consider any observation greater than +2 
as an outlier and exclude it from the analysis. There 
are 93 outliers out of 1,109 observations. Inconsistent 
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with hypothesis 1, there is no evidence that civil law 
firms that cross-list on civil law markets have higher 
leverage before the cross-listing than civil law firms 
that cross-list on common law markets. This is also 
true three years after the cross-listing. On the 
contrary, we find that throughout most of the period, 
common law firms that cross-list in common law 
countries have higher leverage than those that cross-
list on civil law markets. However, the difference is 
only significant in the third year before the cross-
listing according to the parametric test, and in the 
second year following the cross-listing according to 
both the parametric and non-parametric tests.  
Except for common law firms that cross-list on 
common law markets, we find that all groups of firms 
reduce their leverage during the cross-listing year. 
Civil law firms that cross-list on civil law markets 
reduce their leverage by 39% compared only to 13% 
for civil law firms that cross-list on common law 
markets. Also, there is a 3% decline in leverage for 
common law firms that cross-list on civil law markets. 
However, the decline in leverage is not statistically 
significant for any group. We do not find a significant 
increase in the leverage during the cross-listing year 
for common law firms that cross-list on common law 
markets.
5
  
 
4.1.2 Total asset growth (Growth) 
 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for total asset 
growth. There are 1,096 observations out of 1,017 
ranging from –87% to 879%, and only 11 
observations out of 1,017 observations are greater 
than 1000%. Therefore, we consider observations that 
are greater than 1000% as outliers and exclude them 
from the analysis. We find that, in general, civil law 
firms that cross-list on common law markets have 
higher growth opportunities than civil law firms that 
cross-list on civil law markets. Although this is true 
for all years around the cross-listing, it is only 
significant in the cross-listing year at the 1% level 
according to the t-test, and is not significant according 
to the non-parametric test. The finding weakly 
supports hypothesis 2. 
On the contrary, we find that during most of the 
period, common law firms that cross-list on civil law 
markets have higher growth opportunities than their 
counterparts that cross-list on common law markets. 
The difference is only statistically significant in the 
second year following the cross-listing for the 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, but it is not significant 
according to the t-test. However, for the year 
following the cross-listing, we find that common law 
firms that cross-list on common law markets have 
higher asset growth than those that cross-list on civil 
                                                          
5
 In addition, we run the analysis with outliers. In general, we 
do not find a statistically significant difference between 
companies that cross-list on civil law markets and those that 
cross-list on common law markets.  
law markets, but the difference is not statistically 
significant. 
Furthermore, Table 3 reveals that the cross-
listing is associated with an increase in total assets 
during the year of cross-listing for all groups of firms. 
The increase is only significant for civil law and 
common law firms that cross-list on common law 
markets. This suggests that these firms cross-list in 
order to raise external funds.
6
 
 
4.1.3 Relative size (RSize) 
 
Table 4 displays the descriptive statistics for the 
company’s relative size (RSize) to the home market. 
Relative size is calculated by dividing the annual 
average market value for the company over the total 
market value of all domestic firms which are listed on 
its home market. We do not report the RSize for the 
years after the cross-listing because it is not 
informative in the context of hypothesis 3, since the 
company is currently listed on the home and host 
markets. In addition, our aim is to examine whether 
the inability of the company to raise funds in its home 
market before the cross-listing motivates it to cross-
list. Consistent with hypothesis 3, Table 4 reveals that 
the RSize of civil law firms that cross-list on common 
law markets is higher than the RSize of civil law 
firms that cross-list on civil law markets. This is true 
for the cross-listing year and for the three years before 
the cross-listing. However, the difference is 
significant for the third year before the cross-listing 
according to the parametric and non-parametric tests. 
This finding suggests that civil law firms whose 
capital needs are large relative to their home market 
tap large capital markets (i.e., common law markets), 
in order to raise external funds to finance growth 
opportunities. 
There is some evidence that common law firms 
that cross-list on common law markets have a higher 
relative market value than their counterparts that 
cross-list on civil law markets. The difference is 
statistically significant for the cross-listing year and 
one year before the cross-listing, according to the 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, but it is not significant 
according to the t-test. 
 
4.1.4 Share turnover (Turnover) 
 
Table 5 displays the descriptive statistics for the 
trading activity on the home market measured by 
share turnover. Turnover equals the annual average 
number of company shares traded on the home stock 
exchange divided by the number of shares outstanding 
of the company at the end of the year. There are 26 
observations out of 1,063 observations greater than or 
equal to one. Therefore, we consider these 
observations as outliers and exclude them from the 
analysis. Inconsistent with hypothesis 4, there is no 
                                                          
6
 We also perform the analysis for total assets growth with 
the outliers. In general, the results do not change drastically. 
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significant difference in the turnover between the civil 
law firms that cross-list on common law markets and 
those that cross-list on the civil law markets. 
However, the figures for common law firms support 
hypothesis 4. We find that there is a statistically 
significant difference between the two groups of 
common law firms. Throughout the whole period, 
common law firms that cross-list on common law 
markets have a lower turnover ratio than common law 
firms that cross-list on civil law markets. There is a no 
statistically significant increase in the turnover of our 
sample firms during the year of cross-listing. This is 
also true for the year after the cross-listing.
7
 
 
4.2. Examining the relation between 
investor protection and the place of 
cross-listing (The choice between 
regulated or unregulated stock 
exchanges) 
 
To provide further evidence for the relationship 
between cross-listing and investor protection, we 
examine the choice of listing between regulated and 
unregulated international exchanges in relation to the 
bonding hypothesis (Coffee, 2002). We mainly focus 
on two countries, the US and UK, which are 
characterized as having the highest level of investor 
protection (La Porta et al. 1997; 1998). We obtained 
data on firms that cross-listed on the US/UK regulated 
exchanges (AMEX, NASDAQ, and NYSE), where 
the level of regulations and investor protection is 
high, and those that cross-listed on the US 
unregulated exchanges (OTC and PORTAL), where 
the level of regulations and investor protection is low. 
Table 6 provides a distribution of the sample after 
dividing firms according to their legal system (civil-
law versus common-law).  
To test H5, we run a logistic model (equation 1) 
in order to shed light on factors that may influence the 
decision to cross-list on regulated or unregulated 
exchanges. The results of the logistic regression are 
presented in Table 7. The table indicates that firms 
with better investor protection (better accounting 
standards, better anti-director rights regulations, and 
from common law countries) are more likely to cross-
list on regulated exchanges. The table suggests that 
firms with poor accounting standards cross-list on 
unregulated exchanges in the US (OTC and 
PORTAL) in order to prevent additional costs of 
reconciliation to US GAAP/IAS/UK GAAP,
8
 and 
                                                          
7
 We run the analysis with the outliers and obtain similar 
results. We also conduct the analysis after adding the trading 
volume on the foreign market. Although the observations are 
cut to almost half, the analysis (not reported) shows similar 
results in terms of the differences between the groups and in 
terms of the pattern of the trading after the cross-listing. 
8
Foreign firms listed in the US have to partially reconcile to 
US GAAP if listed as ADR level 2, and must fully reconcile to 
US GAAP if listed as ADR level 3. Foreign firms seeking UK 
listing have to report under IAS/US or UK GAAP, except firms 
where the accounting standards of their countries of origin 
are accepted by the UKLA under the mutual recognition 
high levels of enforcement and legal liabilities when 
cross-listing on regulated exchanges. Likewise, large 
firms are more likely than small firms to cross-list on 
regulated exchanges with high levels of investor 
protection. It is worth noting, however, that the mean 
(median) size of firms cross-listed on the NYSE and 
LSE is $6289.02 Mln ($1972.79 Mln) and $6720.12 
Mln ($2410.34 Mln), respectively, which is much 
larger than the $1708.47 Mln ($550.4 Mln) and 
$1611.4 Mln ($713.4 Mln) for foreign firms listed on 
OTC and PORTAL, respectively. Hence, large and 
more sophisticated firms are more likely to be able to 
meet the costs associated with listing on foreign 
regulated exchanges. By contrast, many firms seeking 
low listing costs are expected to go to the US 
unregulated exchanges.
9
 This can be supported by the 
fact that unregulated exchanges account for about 
63% (OTC alone represents about 37%) of foreign 
listing in the US. This is consistent with Doidge et al. 
(2004) who report that the lower tendency of firms 
from a low-level disclosure environment to list on 
regulated stock exchanges is associated with the lower 
net benefits they receive from such listings. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we investigate whether company 
characteristics, other than the control structure, 
influence the choice of cross-listing on civil law 
markets versus common law markets. We do this by 
comparing the characteristics of firms that cross-list 
on common law markets with those of firms that 
cross-list on civil law markets. We also compare the 
characteristics of firms within the same group before 
and after the cross-listing. Furthermore, we predict the 
choice of cross-listing on regulated exchanges with a 
high level of investor protection versus unregulated 
exchanges with a low level of investor protection. 
This paper reveals that firms that cross-list on 
common law markets differ in some financial 
characteristics from firms that cross-list on civil law 
markets. We find that civil law firms that cross-list on 
common law markets have higher growth rates, larger 
size and lower turnover pre cross-listing than their 
counterparts that cross-list on civil law markets. Also, 
we find that common law firms that cross-list on 
common law markets are larger and have lower 
volume turnover than those that cross-list on civil law 
markets. We find that civil and common law firms 
that cross-list on common law markets experience a 
significant increase in their growth during the cross-
                                                                                        
regulations. By contrast, OTC and PORTAL firms do not 
have to register with the SEC, and do not have to report 
using US GAAP; they can report using their home GAAP, or 
any other GAAP. 
9
 PORTAL’s listing and annual fees are the lowest across all 
exchanges. In addition, OTC and PORTAL firms, despite 
having to register with the SEC, do not have to comply with 
all the reporting requirements set by the SEC. In addition, as 
level 1 represents the first step into the US market, many 
foreign firms list as level 1 and go later to levels 2 or 3. 
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listing year. We find no evidence that there is an 
increase in the share turnover during the cross-listing 
year or the year after for all groups of firms.  
We also test the choice of cross-listing and 
provide evidence that is not in line with the bonding 
hypothesis suggested by Coffee (2002), which states 
that firms signal their commitment to protect minority 
investors by cross-listing on exchanges with better 
investor protection regulations. We instead find 
evidence indicating that firms with better investor 
protection (better accounting standards, better anti-
director rights regulations, and from common law 
countries) are more likely to cross-list on regulated 
exchanges. On the other hand, firms with poor 
accounting standards are more likely to cross-list on 
unregulated exchanges in the US (OTC and 
PORTAL), in order to avoid additional costs of 
reconciliation to US GAAP/IAS/UK GAAP, and high 
levels of enforcement and legal liabilities, which they 
face when cross-listing on regulated exchanges. 
Likewise, large firms are more likely to cross-list on 
regulated exchanges, with high levels of investor 
protection, than small firms. These results are 
consistent with those of Doige et al. (2004) who find 
that firms from a lower (higher) disclosure 
environment are less (more) likely to cross-list on 
regulated exchanges. 
 
References 
 
1. Abdallah, A.A., Abdallah W. and Ismail, A.(2012), 
“Do accounting standards matter to financial analysts? 
An empirical analysis of the effect of cross-listing from 
different accounting standards regimes on analyst 
following and forecast error”, The International Journal 
of Accounting, Vol. 47, pp. 168-197. 
2. Abdallah, A.A. and Ioannidis C. (2010), “Why do 
firms cross-list? International Evidence from the US 
market”, The Quarterly Review of Economics and 
Finance, Vol. 50, pp.202-2013. 
3. Abdallah, W. and Goergen, M. (2011), “Evolution of 
Control of Cross-listed firms”, Working paper, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=18
36876. 
4. Abdallah, W. and Goergen, M. (2011), “Does 
corporate control determine the cross-listing location? 
Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 14, pp.183-199. 
5. Brockman, P. and Chung, D. (2003), “Investor 
protection and Firm Liquidity,” Journal of finance, 
Vol. 58, No. 2, pp.921-37. 
6. Baker, H.K. Nofsinger, J.R. and Weaver, D.G. (2002), 
“International cross-listing and visibility”, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 37, No.3, pp. 
495-521. 
7. Barclay, M. J. Litzenberger, R. H. and Warner, J.B., 
(1990), “Private information trading volume, and 
stock-return variances”, Review of Financial Studies 
Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 233-253. 
8. Barton, J. and Waymire, G. B. (2004), “Investor 
protection under unregulated financial reporting”, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 38, No.1-
3, pp. 65-116. 
9. Benos, E. and Weisbach, M. (2004), “Private Benefits 
and Cross-Listings in the United States”, Emerging 
Market Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 217-240. 
10. Coffee, J. (2002), “Racing towards the top? The impact 
of cross-listings and stock market competition on 
international corporate governance”, Columbia Law 
School, Vol. 102, pp. 1757-831. 
11. Coffee, J. (1999), “The future as history: the prospects 
of global convergence in corporate governance and its 
implications”, Northwestern University Law Review, 
Vol. 93, No. 3, pp. 641-708. 
12. Chowdhry, B. and Nanda, V. (1991), “Multi-market 
trading and market liquidity”, Review of Financial 
Studies, Vol. 4, pp. 483-511. 
13. Doidge, G. Karolyi, A. and Stulz, R M. (2003), “Why 
are foreign firms listed in the U.S. worth more?” 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 71, No. 2, pp. 
205-238. 
14. Demirgüc-Kunt, A. and V. Maksimovic (1998), “Law, 
Finance, and Firm Growth,” The Journal of Finance, 
Vol. 53 No. 6, pp. 2107-2137. 
15. Domowitz, I. Glen, J. and Madhavan, A.(1998) 
“International Cross-Listing and order flow migration: 
Evidence from an emerging market”, Journal of 
Finance, Vol.53, No.6, pp. 2001-27. 
16. Eiteman, D.K. Stonehill, A.I. and Moffett, M. H. 
(2013), “Multinational Business Finance”, Prentice 
Hall, Published 08/09/2012, 13/E. 
17. Frost, C. A. and Pownall G. (2000), “Equal access to 
information: Do cross-listed firms’ Stock prices 
respond to earnings disclosed in overseas and local 
markets?” Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 7, pp. 97-127. 
18. Fuerst, O. (1998), “A theoretical analysis of the 
investor protection regulations argument for global 
listing of stocks”, unpublished working paper, mimeo, 
Yale School of Management, http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=139599. 
19. Foerster, S. R. and Karolyi, G. A. (1999), “The effects 
of market segmentation and Investor recognition on 
asset prices: Evidence from foreign stocks listing in the 
United States”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 
981-1013. 
20. Foerster, S. R. and Karolyi, G. A. (1998), 
“Multimarket trading and liquidity: A transaction data 
analysis of Canada-US interlistings”, Journal of 
international Financial Markets, Institutions and 
Money, Vol. 8, pp. 393-412. 
21. Foerster, S. R. and Karolyi, G. A. (1993), 
“International Listings of Stocks: The case of Canada 
and The U.S.”, Journal of International Business 
Studies, Fourth quarter. 
22. Fatemi, A. and Tourani-Rad, A. (1996), “Determinants 
of Cross-Border Listings: The Dutch Evidence”, 
Empirical Issues in Raising Equity Capital. 
23. Kelly, E. and Woidtke, T. (2001), “Exploring 
international differences in investor protection: 
evidence from U.S. foreign market penetration”, 
mimeo, Texas A&M University. 
24. Lang, M. Raedy, J.S. Yetman, M. H. (2003a), “How 
representative are firms that are cross-listed in the 
United States? An analysis of accounting quality”, 
Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 41, No. 2, 
pp.363-396. 
25. Lang, M. Lins, K V. Miller, D. (2003b), “ADRs, 
Analysts and accuracy: Does cross listing in the U.S. 
improve a Firm’s Information Environment and 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014, Continued - 9 
 
 
827 
Increase Market Value?” Journal of Accounting 
Research, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 317-345. 
26. Leuz, C. (2003), “Discussion of ADRs, Analysts and 
Accuracy: Does cross-listing in the U.S. improve a 
Firm’s Information Environment and Increase Market 
Value?” Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 41, 
No.2, pp. 347-362. 
27. Leuz, C. and Verrecchia, R. E. (2000), “The economic 
consequences of increase disclosure”, Journal of 
Accounting Research, Vol. 38, pp. 91-124. 
28. La Porta, R. Lopez-de-Silanes, F. Shleifer, A. and 
Vishny, R. (1997), “Legal Determinants of External 
Finance,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, pp.1131-50. 
29. La Porta, R. Lopez-de-Silanes, F. Shleifer, A. and 
Vishny, R. (1998), “Law and Finance,” Journal of 
Political Economy”, Vol. 106, pp. 1113-1155. 
30. Miller, D. (1999), “The market reaction to the 
international cross-listings: Evidence from depositary 
receipts”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.51, pp. 
103-23. 
31. Mittoo, U. (1997), “Cross-country listing and trading 
volume: Evidence from the Toronto and Vancouver 
stock exchanges”, Journal of International Financial 
Management and Accounting, Vol.8, No.3, pp.147-74. 
32. Mittoo, U. (1992), “Managerial Perceptions of the Net 
Benefits of Foreign Listing: Canadian Evidence,” 
Journal of International Financial Management and 
Accounting, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 40-62. 
33. Noronha, G M. Sarin A. Saudagaran S. M. (1996), 
“Testing for micro-structure effects of international 
dual listing using intraday data”, Journal of Banking 
and Finance, Vol.20, pp.965-983. 
34. Piotroski,. D.J., Srinivasan, S. (2008), “Regulation and 
bonding: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the flow of 
international listings”, Rock Center for Corporate 
Governance, Working Paper No. 11. 
35. Ramchand, L. Sethapakdi, P. (2000), “Changes in 
systematic risk following global equity issuance”, 
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 24, pp. 1491-
1513. 
36. Reese, W.A. Weisbach, M.S. (2002), “Protection of 
minority shareholder interests, cross listings in the 
United States, and subsequent equity offerings”, 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 66, pp. 65-104. 
37. Tesar L., Werner, I. (1995), “Home bias and high 
turnover”, Journal of International Money and Finance, 
Vol.14, pp. 467-492. 
 
 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014, Continued - 9 
 
 
828 
Table 1. Distribution of sample companies 
 
Panel A: Number of cross-listings (CLS) by companies in the final sample and their cross-listing locations for the period 1990-2000 
 
 Country of  
origin 
Neuer. 
mkt 
Euro.NM  
Amsterdam 
Lenouvea  
marche 
Brussels  Frankfurt  Paris  Amsterdam  Stockholm  OSLO  Swiss  Aus- 
tra- 
lian  
New  
Zealand  
Irish Tokyo  To- 
ron- 
to  
LSE NYSE NASDAQ Total 
1 Belgium     1 1   1          3 
2 Germany      2 1   3    1   2 6 10 
3 France                  5 5 
4 Italy       1          2 1 3 
5 Netherlands    2 2     1      3 2 4 7 
6 Sweden                 1 4 5 
7 Norway                1 1 2 4 
8 Switzerland 1    1   2        2 1 2 5 
9 Austria     1      1      1  2 
10 Australia            10   1   5 15 
11 New Zealand           5       1 6 
12 Denmark 1                  1 
13 Ireland               1 5 1 3 7 
14 South Africa    1            1  1 3 
15 Japan     7 1          6 3 1 14 
16 Canada        1 1 1 2  1    4 25 34 
17 UK 1 2  1 1  4  2    2    2 15 24 
18 US 3  1 3 3 2 2 2 1 3 3   1 3 4   27 
 Total  6 2 1 7 16 6 8 5 5 8 11 10 3 2 5 22 20 75 175 
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Panel B: Distribution of sample companies by their country of origin 
 
Common law countries Civil law countries 
Australia 15 Austria 2 
Canada 34 Belgium 3 
Ireland 7 Denmark 1 
New Zealand 6 France 5 
South Africa 3 Germany 10 
United Kingdom 24 Italy 3 
United States 27 Japan 14 
  Netherlands 7 
  Norway 4 
  Sweden 5 
  Switzerland 5 
Sub-total 116  59 
Total Common + Civil  175 
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Panel C: Number of sample companies in each legal system and their cross-listing location 
 
  Host country  
  Civil law Common law Total 
Home 
country 
Civil law 17 42 59 
Common law 30 86 116 
 No. of companies 47 128 175 
 
Panel D: Civil versus common law firms that have cross-listed on US and LSE between 1980 and 2000 
 
  AMEX NASDAQ NYSE OTC PORTAL LSE Total % 
English Law Origin 13 65 116 200 49 52 495 0.544 
French Law Origin  8 36 62 23 10 139 0.153 
German Law Origin  14 23 124 39 24 224 0.246 
Scandinavian Law Origin  4 11 9 2 4 30 0.033 
Others     1 9 7 5 22 0.024 
Total 13 91 187 404 120 95 910 1 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and univariate tests for leverage 
 
Mean, median, minimum, maximum and sample size 
 CLS-3 CLS-2 CLS-1 CLS CLS+1 CLS+2 CLS+3 CLS> 3 
Civil law companies cross listed in civil law countries (22)  
Mean 0.444 0.468 0.437 0.266 0.573 0.505 0.377 0.321 
Median 0.375 0.289 0.351 0.198 0.500 0.391 0.338 0.157 
Minimum 0.121 0.086 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Maximum 1.038 1.533 1.262 0.664 1.734 1.690 0.970 1.849 
Sample size 10 11 13 16 11 10 7 26 
Civil law companies cross listed in common law countries (21)  
Mean 0.601 0.420 0.447 0.388 0.438 0.489 0.497 0.630 
Median 0.508 0.323 0.382 0.088 0.423 0.331 0.328 0.594 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 1.772 1.536 1.765 1.948 1.948 1.330 1.659 1.393 
Sample size 11 18 22 41 27 20 15 20 
Common law companies cross listed in civil law countries (12)  
Mean 0.211 0.175 0.270 0.261 0.205 0.233 0.280 0.422 
Median 0.090 0.015 0.068 0.031 0.055 0.017 0.001 0.367 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 0.727 1.053 1.095 1.215 0.935 1.143 1.236 1.338 
Sample size 12 17 22 27 18 14 13 28 
Common law companies cross listed in common law countries (11)  
Mean 0.432 0.302 0.262 0.324 0.350 0.509 0.424 0.470 
Median 0.195 0.069 0.072 0.084 0.164 0.332 0.315 0.322 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 2.000 1.451 1.812 1.949 1.546 1.752 1.745 1.887 
Sample size 32 41 56 70 56 45 31 76 
t-statistics for the difference in means between the groups  
(22) vs. (21) -0.883 0.280 -0.068 -1.213 0.738 0.087 -0.658 -2.112 
p-value 0.388 0.782 0.947 0.230 0.465 0.931 0.519 0.040 
(12) vs. (11) -1.754 -1.141 0.078 -0.672 -1.473 -1.807 -0.932 -0.561 
p-value 0.087 0.259 0.938 0.503 0.145 0.076 0.357 0.576 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney p-value for the difference in means between the groups  
(22) vs.(21) 0.398 0.529 0.946 0.516 0.664 0.775 0.972 0.035 
(12) vs.(11) 0.760 0.483 0.809 0.371 0.135 0.062 0.141 0.837 
p-value of t-statistics for the difference in means within the same group 
Group 22  Group 21   Group 12  Group 11  
CLS+1 -CLS-1 0.51 CLS+1 -CLS-1 0.945  CLS+1 -CLS-1 0.545 CLS+1 -CLS-1 0.24 
CLS-CLS-1 0.16 CLS-CLS-1 0.664  CLS-CLS-1 0.936 CLS-CLS-1 0.406 
CLS+1-CLS 0.065 CLS+1-CLS 0.701  CLS+1-CLS 0.59 CLS+1-CLS 0.73 
 
Notes: 
 
1- Leverage is the ratio of long term-debt divided by the total share capital and reserves. 
2- p-values for the two-tailed test. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics and univariate tests for growth 
 
Mean, median, minimum, maximum and sample size 
 CLS-3 CLS-2 CLS-1 CLS CLS+1 CLS+2 CLS+3 CLS> 3 
Civil law companies cross listed in civil law countries (22)  
Mean 12.636 39.130 9.739 24.811 16.767 17.677 4.453 13.362 
Median 6.824 5.696 10.557 13.475 7.624 4.828 -1.565 3.823 
Minimum -15.310 -1.569 -27.337 -8.878 -8.781 -27.903 -17.408 -28.060 
Maximum 74.212 297.584 37.432 112.757 111.411 74.880 40.886 98.397 
Sample size 11 14 15 16 13 11 8 34 
Civil law companies cross listed in common law countries (21)  
Mean 112.194 53.395 32.893 159.775 24.825 19.075 11.730 11.138 
Median 13.069 12.115 15.522 32.616 11.353 18.789 9.321 6.235 
Minimum -2.687 -25.064 -26.425 -7.163 -16.925 -25.819 -33.106 -13.381 
Maximum 825.392 340.016 272.039 782.270 284.335 90.917 58.807 59.610 
Sample size 15 22 26 33 27 19 14 22 
Common law companies cross listed in civil law countries (12)  
Mean 19.357 38.679 88.271 95.569 49.558 67.847 21.411 24.389 
Median 10.243 7.722 16.233 55.350 15.827 -0.040 8.507 9.956 
Minimum -4.107 -19.181 -26.944 -33.543 -56.202 -53.582 -27.361 -22.493 
Maximum 50.631 335.928 582.666 310.508 297.524 850.401 169.685 490.687 
Sample size 9 11 20 26 20 13 13 31 
Common law companies cross listed in common law countries (11)  
Mean 23.964 32.285 46.392 90.452 55.218 40.016 36.473 14.695 
Median 9.190 9.508 21.875 30.651 13.965 29.304 13.110 5.536 
Minimum -63.871 -49.271 -39.075 -43.824 -49.898 -15.909 -87.012 -56.561 
Maximum 157.370 636.420 305.838 777.307 879.131 165.474 403.440 167.089 
Sample size 27 35 44 57 59 48 36 85 
t-statistics for the difference in means between the groups  
(22) vs. (21) -1.600 -0.457 -1.263 -3.404 -0.483 -0.133 -0.785 0.335 
p-value 0.131 0.651 0.214 0.002 0.632 0.895 0.442 0.739 
(12) vs. (11) -0.251 0.172 -1.138 -0.151 0.172 -0.423 -0.544 0.836 
p-value 0.804 0.864 0.267 0.880 0.864 0.680 0.589 0.405 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney p-value for the difference in means between the groups  
(22) vs. (21) 0.186 0.436 0.317 0.208 0.697 0.401 0.195 0.933 
(12) vs. (11) 0.784 0.528 0.873 0.372 0.565 0.060 0.556 0.998 
p-value of t-statistics for the difference in means within the same group 
Group 22  Group 21   Group 12  Group 11  
CLS+1 -CLS-1 0.451 CLS+1 -CLS-1 0.643  CLS+1 -CLS-1 0.36 CLS+1 -CLS-1 0.70 
CLS-CLS-1 0.11 CLS-CLS-1 0.007  CLS-CLS-1 0.85 CLS-CLS-1 0.092 
CLS+1-CLS 0.50 CLS+1-CLS 0.003  CLS+1-CLS 0.139 CLS+1-CLS 0.197 
 
Notes: 
 
1- Growth is the annual assets growth. 
2- p-values for the two-tailed test. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics and univariate tests for relative size (RSize) in % 
 
Mean, median, minimum, maximum and sample size 
 CLS-3 CLS-2 CLS-1 CLS 
Civil law companies cross listed in civil law countries (22) 
Mean 0.220 0.285 0.305 0.434 
Median 0.043 0.068 0.090 0.306 
Minimum 0.022 0.018 0.022 0.022 
Maximum 1.482 1.389 1.701 2.408 
Sample size 11 13 13 17 
Civil law companies cross listed in common law countries (21) 
Mean 1.150 0.943 0.866 1.560 
Median 0.702 0.104 0.118 0.257 
Minimum 0.028 0.035 0.036 0.017 
Maximum 3.306 4.933 4.034 13.036 
Sample size 9 13 14 42 
Common law companies cross listed in civil law countries (12) 
Mean 0.118 0.110 0.085 0.093 
Median 0.012 0.011 0.018 0.022 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 0.868 0.883 0.984 1.427 
Sample size 15 17 23 30 
Common law companies cross listed in common law countries (11) 
Mean 0.162 0.171 0.184 0.440 
Median 0.037 0.028 0.020 0.046 
Minimum 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 
Maximum 2.368 2.211 1.801 14.095 
Sample size 38 47 55 84 
t-statistics for the difference in means between the groups 
(22) vs. (21) -1.973 -1.493 -1.418 -2.286 
p-value 0.079 0.158 0.175 0.027 
(12) vs. (11) -0.372 -0.566 -1.120 -1.163 
p-value 0.711 0.573 0.266 0.247 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney p-value for the difference in means between the groups 
(22) vs. (21) 0.087 0.137 0.159 0.269 
(12) vs.(11) 0.418 0.330 0.065 0.007 
 
Notes: 
 
1- Relative size is the ratio of the annual average market value of the company divided by the market value 
of all domestic firms listed on the home stock exchange at the end of the year multiplied by 100.  
2- p-values for the two-tailed test 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics and univariate tests for share turnover 
 
Mean, median, minimum, maximum and sample size 
 CLS-3 CLS-2 CLS-1 CLS CLS+1 CLS+2 CLS+3 CLS> 3 
Civil law companies cross listed in civil law countries (22)  
Mean 0.054 0.041 0.044 0.100 0.092 0.057 0.088 0.046 
Median 0.018 0.019 0.020 0.027 0.025 0.018 0.023 0.035 
Minimum 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Maximum 0.281 0.192 0.282 0.382 0.441 0.344 0.342 0.141 
Sample size 9 10 12 17 13 10 9 34 
Civil law companies cross listed in common law countries (21)  
Mean 0.037 0.071 0.019 0.067 0.039 0.041 0.023 0.019 
Median 0.024 0.019 0.008 0.028 0.015 0.026 0.016 0.012 
Minimum 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 
Maximum 0.083 0.386 0.056 0.651 0.217 0.283 0.063 0.096 
Sample size 6 8 8 37 30 20 15 30 
Common law companies cross listed in civil law countries (12)  
Mean 0.086 0.122 0.089 0.124 0.072 0.056 0.069 0.132 
Median 0.030 0.053 0.049 0.037 0.030 0.035 0.052 0.060 
Minimum 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.006 0.000 0.002 
Maximum 0.374 0.568 0.494 0.885 0.417 0.243 0.342 0.603 
Sample size 13 16 20 30 23 14 14 31 
Common law companies cross listed in common law countries (11)  
Mean 0.025 0.027 0.041 0.054 0.029 0.029 0.038 0.026 
Median 0.011 0.014 0.016 0.018 0.016 0.019 0.019 0.023 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 0.145 0.116 0.348 0.813 0.316 0.319 0.348 0.105 
Sample size 31 39 49 75 63 50 39 84 
t-statistics for the difference in means between the groups  
(22) vs. (21) 0.463 -0.674 0.873 0.905 1.336 0.539 1.634 3.182 
p-value 0.651 0.51 0.394 0.370 0.204 0.594 0.140 0.003 
(12) vs. (11) 1.695 2.305 1.757 1.825 1.884 1.771 1.540 3.467 
p-value 0.114 0.035 0.092 0.076 0.071 0.081 0.130 0.002 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney p-value for the difference in means between the groups  
(22) vs. (21) 0.768 0.859 0.354 0.955 0.597 0.495 0.270 0.022 
(12) vs. (11) 0.026 0.093 0.024 0.010 0.020 0.037 0.039 0.000 
p-value of t-statistics for the difference in means within the same group 
Group 22  Group 21   Group 12  Group 11  
CLS+1 -CLS-1 0.30 CLS+1 -CLS-1 0.282  CLS+1 -CLS-1 0.611 CLS+1 -CLS-1 0.244 
CLS-CLS-1 0.215 CLS-CLS-1 0.265  CLS-CLS-1 0.483 CLS-CLS-1 0.492 
CLS+1-CLS 0.887 CLS+1-CLS 0.23  CLS+1-CLS 0.26 CLS+1-CLS 0.119 
 
Notes: 
 
1- Share turnover is the ratio of the annual average volume of trading shares in thousands divided by the 
number of shares outstanding at the end of the year. 
2- p-values for the two-tailed test. 
 
 
 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014, Continued - 9 
 
 
835 
Table 6. Logit model: Regulated versus unregulated foreign listing 
 
Investor protection measures  Accounting  
standards 
  Anti-director  
rights 
  CIVIL/COMMON 
Intercept -6.9556***  -4.2572***  -2.7427*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Accounting standards 0.0634***     
 (0.000)     
Anti-director rights   0.3585***   
   (0.000)   
French Law Dummy     -0.4847* 
     (0.082) 
German Law Dummy     -1.5107*** 
     (0.000) 
Scandinavian Dummy     -0.4301 
     (0.388) 
DEVMD 0.1221  0.4471*  0.6030** 
 (0.673)  (0.088)  (0.021) 
LNMV 0.3236***  0.3294***  0.3663*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ROA -0.0116*  -0.0140**  -0.0151** 
 (0.097)  (0.045)  (0.037) 
N 509  520  525 
Max-rescaled R
2
 0.1599  0.1598  0.2084 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.1128  0.1128  0.1448 
 
Notes: 
 
1. The accounting standards variable is the rating of accounting standards in the home country of the CL firm taken from 
La Porta (1998). 
2. The anti-director rights variable is an index developed by La Porta et al. (1997; 1998). 
3. The French origin dummy, German origin dummy, and Scandinavian origin dummy are dummy variables that each take 
the value of one if the firm is from French law origin, German law origin, and Scandinavian law origin, respectively, 
and zero otherwise. 
4. LNMV is the natural Log of the firm’s market value at day -60 (two months before cross-listing. 
5. DEVMD is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is from a developed country and zero otherwise.  
6. ROA is the average of the three year return on assets in the pre cross-listing period. 
7. N is the number of observations (firms) in the regression.  
8. IPM stands for investor protection measures. 
9. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
